Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

American Domination of the Net:
A Preliminary Ethnographic Exploration of Causes, Economic
Implications for Europe, and Future Prospects
Eric K. Clemons
The Wharton School
clemons@upenn.edu

Helmut Krcmar
Technical University of
Munich

Sebastian Hermes
Technical University of
Munich

krcmar@in.tum.de

Sebastian.Hermes@in.tum.de

Abstract
European executives largely agree that American operators of online platforms dominate online business
in the EU. There is less consensus on the reasons for
American domination and on the possible economic
consequences of this domination for the growth of EU
business, for employment, for the strength of the EU
economies, or for the national security of individual
EU member states. With a series of interviews with
German executives in a range of industries we examine opinions of the causes of American domination of
the net, the current consequences, and the potential for
future economic harm. We develop a set of hypotheses, which can be examined with a larger survey and
with econometric analysis.

1. Introduction
European online infrastructure is largely controlled by
a small number of American giants, which operate
large networks and consumer-focused extensible platforms. Google’s Android platform dominates mobile
computing. Amazon does not yet dominate all shopping, but it has the dominant online shopping platform
and is extending this platform to offer convenient
smart home management, including voice-based shopping. Facebook is the dominant social networking
platform, and indeed in much of the world it is the only
social networking platform of any significance. And
the market for cloud services is shared among American giants Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and
Salesforce. Microsoft also continues to dominate the
traditional desk-top platform, though it has not been
able to dominate any aspect of online infrastructure
and is not a factor outside of cloud services.
Does this matter? Is this American domination of
platform-based consumer-focused infrastructure important? It clearly appears significant to the European
Commission, which has recently imposed a third fine
on Google for abuse of monopoly power with its Android platform [28].
How would we as academic researchers in information systems economics and strategy assess the significance of American domination of consumer-focused platform-based web services? Does it affect
economic growth in the EU? Does it affect EU employment? Does it affect national security? Why did
it happen? And, if indeed it does matter, what are the
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appropriate responses? What, if anything, should be
done?
Our research methodology for this paper reflects
its position as the first, exploratory study in a larger
multifaceted study that will entail hypothesis testing
with surveys and econometric analysis. Our research
methodology in this paper begins with ethnographic
studies, a small set of in-depth semantically rich interviews intended to allow us to develop our hypotheses.
This paper is part of an ongoing research effort. The
limitations of this paper and of the first stage of our
study are addressed in a section on limitations. The
next steps required to complete our analyses are reviewed in a section on future research.

2. Historical Context and Motivation
In an uncertain world, some industries have always
been considered essential to national security. In 1904
First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher was concerned that if another European War were to occur, Britain would desperately need battleships. Battleship turrets were the
most complex machinery of the era. He knew that if
he stopped Purchasing battleships in 1904, he might
have no remaining source of turret technology outside
of Germany. Although Fisher considered Germany an
ally in any future European conflict, battleship technology was too critical to entrust to any ally, and
Fisher made expensive and unpopular commitments to
the defense industry to preserve the necessary capability within Britain [19]. One might argue that internet
technology and platform technology are as important
today as naval capability was before the First World
War. If President Trump can argue that aluminum and
steel are so critical to national defense that competing
companies in Europe, China, and Canada cannot collectively be trusted to meet US national security requirements [31], then clearly Europe can argue that internet technology is essential today. Similarly, President Trump has argued that US jobs in coal, steel, and
aluminum [9] are so essential to the US economy that
they are worth protecting on national security grounds.
Surely EU countries can argue that it is worth protecting at least some participation in the most profitable
industries in today’s economy.
We are not the first academic authors to address
American domination of the net. A conference paper
on the same themes was presented in Berlin in 2016
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[8]. But this paper is the first step we have seen towards an integrated academic study of the problem.
Likewise, we are not the only authors addressing
how to proceed to mitigate the domination of the net
by American platforms. A coalition of German industrial firms has been studying and writing about how to
respond [32]. Their proposal is to form a cross-industry coalition with its own portal, so that German consumers could have a German identity. That is, German
consumers could log into future consumer-focused
websites using a German login, instead of using the
Facebook or Google or Amazon logins. It is not yet
clear how this would mitigate any of the risks of American domination. Individuals do not use Facebook or
Google or Amazon solely so that they have an ID to
log into other systems, and consumers will continue to
use Google to search, Facebook to hang out with
friends online, and Amazon to shop. This proposal
does not address the domination of American platforms in those areas. Again, we believe that our paper
is the first step towards an integrated academic study
of the extent of the problem and the first attempt at
developing a strategy for responding.

3. Review of the Role of Semantically
Rich Case Studies
Perhaps the most important proponent of using ethnographic observation and semantically rich case studies
for the generation of testable hypotheses is [13].
Moreover, others have explored the significance of
such studies specifically in the field of information
systems research; see, for example, [20] and [3].
We feel that the questions we are asking are important, but that we are not yet ready to conduct more
formal research. Until we are certain we are asking
the right questions and asking all of the right questions,
it is premature to conduct large surveys to explore the
answers to those questions. Until we know whether
executives believe that economic harm has occurred,
and until we know what factors executives believe are
significant or what sectors have been affected, it may
likewise be premature to begin our statistical analyses.
[21] provides moral support for assessing importance
before conducting our formal research.
In the development of any field or discipline, there
comes a period where 'respectability' insidiously
reigns. ... Subtly, choices are made which profoundly affect the field: methodological rigor and
precision become prized over phenomenological
significance, researching over scholarship, conceptual edifices for scientists only, and reification
over elucidation. [21, p. 5]
We do expect to have statistical significance in the
later elements of our study of American domination of
the net in Europe. However, [22] reminds us that statistical significance alone is not sufficient. It does not
provide an explanation of causal mechanisms, and

thus does not provide corroboration of theories. Moreover, statistical significance alone does not provide
guidance for strategic responses:
[T]he finding of statistical significance is perhaps the least important attribute of a good experiment: it is never a sufficient condition for
concluding that theory has been corroborated,
[nor] that a useful empirical fact has been established with reasonable confidence. ... The value
of any research can be determined, not from the
statistical results, but only by skilled subjective
evaluation of the coherence and reasonableness
of the theory, the degree of experimental control
employed, the sophistication of the measuring
techniques, the scientific or practical importance
of the phenomena studied, and so on. [22, p. 158159]
Even earlier, [18] defends the essential, indeed
foundational role of subjective, qualitative data in tying together empirical research:
Qualitative data and analysis function as the glue
that cements the interpretation of multimethod results. In one respect, qualitative data are used as
the critical counter-point to quantitative methods.
[18, p.609]
More recently, information systems researchers
have published case studies that were used to develop
theories, which we subsequently explored and tested
by others. See for example, [6], who used the case
study of Capital One to formulate the theory of newly
vulnerable markets. The same authors then used a
later, larger study of Capital One, after it had expanded
into other lines of business, to test the theory [7]. Their
use of Capital One was selected because it provided a
natural experiment, consistent with the philosophy of
[13] and [20] for using case studies. Subsequent studies by other authors have also used case studies in information systems to test the theory of newly vulnerable markets; see, for example [15].

4. The Historical Role of Platforms
and of Platform Envelopment
The recent attention to the platform revolution [23]
suggests that platform operators have gained power
only recently, and that platform envelopment as a form
of monopoly power may be quite recent. The most
obvious example of a platform-based strategy and the
ability to develop monopoly power is Google and the
development of Android, described more fully below.
The most recent case resolved by litigation was
the American Department of Justice complaint against
Microsoft for bundling features like Internet Explorer
into their Windows operating system, pre-installing
Internet Explorer, and creating interoperability problems for Netscape.
But the problems proposed by extensible technology platforms and by the use of platform envelopment
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strategies to gain monopoly power have existed for
decades. For example, AT&T operated the first commercially successful radio station, WEAF, in New
York in 1922. The Federal Radio Commission, the
precursor to the Federal Communications Commission, was concerned that since AT&T was the only operator of long distance telecommunications in the US,
AT&T could deny other operators of radio stations the
technology they needed to create multi-station networks, by denying them the ability to transmit signals
over land lines to remote locations for rebroadcast.
The Commission therefore forced AT&T to choose
between operating a commercial radio station or operating its telephony business, effectively ending their
platform envelopment strategy [34].

5. Motivation and Propositions,
Used to Generate Hypotheses
Our initial expectations when starting this study were
that American firms had earned billions of Euros monetizing private and personal information, in ways that
were illegal for European firms. This gave American
firms an incentive to enter markets that European
firms did not have. Google’s advertising business is
its largest revenue source, and it is largely based on
revenue streams from monetizing information based
on individual customers’ search history, email, GPS
data, and numerous other sources. Facebook’s largest
revenue stream likewise comes from monetizing private information from its billions of users. Since there
are no effective European competitors, these American giants enjoy near-monopoly power in the EU.
Additionally, we expected that American firms
then used their core businesses to develop platform envelopment strategies [14, 23, 24], leveraging their near
monopolies to dominate other business sectors.
Google used revenue from paid search to develop Android. It used the Mobile Application Distribution
Agreement (MADA) to control placement of applications on all Android devices [11, 12]. The control created by the MADA gave Google the power to determine which apps could succeed, and which apps could
not succeed in Europe. Indeed, abuse of the Android
platform to obtain unfair (monopoly) advantage is the
basis of the most recent 2018 EU Competition Commission’s complaint against Google [29].
Google is not alone in leveraging power in one
core area to develop a powerful platform with a platform envelopment strategy. Amazon has used its
domination of online sales to develop massive control
over online books, and Apple has used its domination
of online music sales to support very aggressive pricing models in its negotiations with music publishers,
though neither of these appear to approach full monopoly power.
The creation and defense of a sequence of monopolies clearly violated both European and American antitrust law, and was the basis of the Department of Justice’s successful litigation against Microsoft in 1998

[4]. See complaint: [33]. And yet, the courts’ understanding of monopoly power in a platform envelopment strategy is less mature and less complete than the
understanding of monopoly power in more traditional
settings, especially in manufacturing.
Thus, our expectation was that the revenue source
created by monetizing private information, when skillfully combined with leveraging initial monopoly positions to develop subsequent platform-based monopolies, would be widely seen as the basis of American
domination.

6. Description of Recent Major
Privacy Violations
Table 1 (at end) lists 49 major incidents of privacy violations as reported in the global mass media. The incidents occurred over the past eight years, and they
originated almost equally within the US and outside
the US. The references to the source material used to
create these tables will be available online as Appendix A, which includes 52 articles obtained from published news reports.
As we expected, the bulk of the reported incidents
were against American firms. The vast majority, 40
out of 49 incidents or 82%, were against American
firms. When formal complaints are examined the ratio
is even more striking, with 25 out of 26, or 96% of
complaints filed against American firms. Additionally, further examination indicated that many of these
privacy violations were of economic, competitive, and
strategic importance to these American firms. Not surprisingly, we found that a slight majority, 17 of 28 or
61% of the formal complaints were filed in the EU.
Again not surprisingly, we found that the EU, and Germany in particular, were more likely to impose some
form of punishment, with 13 out of 22 or 59% of penalties imposed in the EU. Finally, and not surprisingly, the vast majority of penalties, 21 out of 22 or
95%, were imposed against US firms.
Although we were able to substantiate empirically
the role of monetizing privacy to create massive revenue streams that were not available to European firms,
as described below our interviews did not show that
executives shared our beliefs in the importance of either privacy violations or antimonopoly violations as
the principal source of American companies’ online
power. It was necessary to develop a more comprehensive explanation for the domination of the net in
the EU by a small number of American platform operators.

7. Results of Our Interviews
In June of 2018 we conducted 10 interviews with executives or officers in 8 organizations, including financial services, software services, manufacturers of consumer appliances, manufacturers of heavy industrial
equipment, automobile manufacture, and the German
military. All of these interviews were with German
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firms, which is a serious limitation that will be addressed in subsequent studies. While the EU is intended to function as a single market, it is not clear that
all European executives face the same problems or
have the same reactions to them.
Our interviews showed that our initial assumptions
were far too simplistic, at least as an explanation of the
beliefs of our German interview subjects. The results
of our interviews are summarized below. We reported
all of the answers suggested by our interview subjects;
we list them by our subjective assessment of the
strength of the subjects’ beliefs and of the frequency
with which individual ideas were suggested by different executives.

7.1. Why do American firms dominate the
net in Europe?
American firms faced a single market with a single
regulatory regime while European firms faced fragmented markets with different national preferences,
different languages, and different regulatory regimes.
American firms were able to gain economies of scale
quickly, which allowed them to achieve positive network effects and to achieve economies of scale on development and operating expenses.
American firms entered first, and achieved network effects and economies of scale first simply because of
first mover effects. The American firms were lucky
enough to enter first, capture the market first, learn
about consumer preferences first, and their advantage
is a result of a lack of initiative among German companies when considering online opportunities.
American venture capital firms are more familiar with
speculative ventures in information systems and have
a more sophisticated attitude towards risk. German
venture capital firms avoided losses, and most speculative ventures do fail. American firms managed their
portfolios and were seeking 20X returns on a few winners. While German firms were avoiding losses and
avoiding speculation, American firms were content to
lose their investments 90% of the time, since if they
achieved 20X 10% of the time they would still be doubling their money quickly.
American entrepreneurs and executives had different
attitudes towards risk and towards public disapproval,
and were willing to risk legal censure or public disapproval. German firms avoided anything that was not
yet known to be legal and acceptable to the public.
American firms risked anything that had not been
shown to be illegal, or had not yet been successfully
prosecuted as illegal. This is also supported by tables
1 and 2. American firms were also more willing to risk
public disapproval. As Google CEO Eric Schmidt declared, his job was to understand what the public considered creepy, and to take Google as close to the
creepy line as possible. “There is what I call the
creepy line. The Google policy on a lot of things is to
get right up to the creepy line and not cross it.” [26]

American firms benefited from lax enforcement of privacy law in the US and lax enforcement of privacy law
against US firms operating in Europe. While this was
suggested by some executives late in their interviews,
it did not receive nearly the degree of significance we
anticipated when planning our studies.
American firms were able to implement platform envelopment strategies because of lax enforcement of antitrust law in the US and antimonopoly law in the EU
or because of outdated antitrust law in the US and antimonopoly law in the EU. While this was acknowledged as potentially significant when we suggested it
during our interviews, it was not volunteered or suggested by any interview subjects as a significant cause
of the domination of the net by American platform operators.

7.2. Is the American domination of the net
significant in any way?
Yes, because this domination represents domination by
a few giant platform operators with near monopoly
power in their respective spheres of influence. The
fact that the firms are all American is not significant.
Yes, because this domination represents lost profits,
which are earned by foreign firms and not EU firms.
The repatriation of profits represents a significant drag
on or tax on the economies of European nations.
Yes, because this domination represents lost employment opportunities within the EU. Almost all employment in internet giants is employment by American
firms.
Yes, because the cost of paying for services from monopoly platform operators may be excessive.
Google’s charges for keywords is already a significant
tax on commerce in the EU, and Amazon has the
power to demand significant rebates from European
firms that wish to sell to their consumers in their home
market.
Yes, because American firms’ lax attention to social
norms allows fake news to prosper, which represents
a threat to the functioning of democracy. Facebook’s
role in the manipulation of public opinion before the
2016 presidential election [1, 25], and its manipulation
of public opinion before the Brexit vote [30], are both
significant examples.
Yes, because European firms will have fewer opportunities to expand in the future than their American
counterparts. Future online applications will increasingly require integration into existing platforms, and
European firms would systematically be denied access
while applications developed by the platforms themselves would dominate. future ops
Yes, there are significant threats to the national security of all members of the EU. The one military office
we spoke to said that the current situation was certainly grounds for concern. He argued that national
security concerns existed any time key infrastructure,
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any key infrastructure, was operated entirely by foreign companies. He also believed that the risks were
exacerbated as American culture and American interests appeared to be diverging rapidly from those of the
EU.
No, Domination by a small number of American platforms does not matter at all. One interview subject
said, in essence, the following. We are a global firm.
We obey all the laws of all the countries in which we
operate. Our competitors do as well. While we may
face threats from competitors that understand the use
of the net for customer support better than we do, we
are not affected by Google, Facebook, Amazon, or
other firms. We sell to giant industrial firms and to
national governments; our customers do not search for
sellers through Google, do not look on Facebook pages
to make their purchasing decisions, and do not purchase on Amazon.

7.3. Will American domination of the net be
significant in the future?
Yes, domination by a small number of American platforms will become more significant in the future as a
result of the increasing importance of the internet of
things. More functions in the home will be integrated
into platforms operated by American firms, especially
Google Home and Amazon Alexa. These firms will
exclude EU partners and will extend their own platform capabilities and their own domination.
Yes, EU retailers and manufacturers of small home appliances will have to pay significant fees to the American platforms for access to their own consumers.
This is analogous to the high fees that some sellers today have to pay for positioning in search.
Yes, American operators of extensive platforms already have much more experience integrating functionality and managing complexity, and will provide
better and more complete customer experience than
any single EU firm or even any single EU industry.
No individual European firm, and no single European
industry, will be able to provide the level of functionality and the level of convenience offered by American
platform operators.
Yes. As American platform operators gain power and
their presence becomes more universal under the internet of things, national security concerns will become even more severe. American platform operators
may be able to sabotage European homes, European
roadways, and European manufacturing. This is exacerbated by trade wars and by the diverging cultural
values of European and American societies.
No. German industry is already forging intra-industry
alliances, such as the cooperation among automobile
manufacturers. As a result, they will be able to provide
smart car-to-car and car-to-road management, smart
train-to-train and train to track and train to maintenance schedule management, and will be able to do so

without need for any American intermediation.

7.4. Impact of the New General Data
Protection Regulation
What impact will the new General Data Protection
Regulation have on the balance between EU and
American firms and how will it affect the power of
currently dominant platform operators?
None. It is already too late for EU firms to recover
their competitive position.
Positive. It will limit platforms’ ability to commit privacy abuses in the future, which will level the playing
field at least partially.
Positive. It will increase transparency, so users will
be concerned if their data are abused. It will permit
transportability, so users who are dissatisfied with the
way their data are used on Facebook can, in theory,
easily migrate along with their friends to a new competing website that provides a “cleaner” service.
Negative. EU firms will be held to even stricter standards while US platform operators will continue to ignore local regulations.

8. Hypotheses
We developed five hypotheses as a result of our interviews. We developed a sixth hypothesis when we
planned how we might further explore whether the results of executives’ beliefs, as expressed in surveys,
were reflected in company performance, as reflected
in econometric data.
We note that it would be bad research design to
attempt to test six hypotheses with ten data points.
However, in this paper we are not testing any hypotheses. We did generate our six hypotheses from conversations with only ten individuals, but these conversations averaged over an hour, and there was ample
opportunity to explore a large number of topics. These
topics were then reduced to six hypotheses.
We also note that all of our initial interviews were
with German executives, and that our hypotheses all
make statements about European executives. This is a
serious limitation, which will be addressed in two
ways in subsequent phases of the study. We will conduct interviews in other EU countries. And we conduct our surveys in enough EU countries to examine
national differences in the responses we receive.
Hypothesis H1: European executives in all industries
are aware of American domination of net-based businesses.
Hypothesis H2: European executives in all industries
are concerned about American domination of netbased businesses.
Hypothesis H2A: European executives whose businesses require consumer interaction for retail sales are
extremely concerned.
Hypothesis H2B: European executives whose busiPage 6129

nesses require selling software to individuals are extremely concerned.
Hypothesis H2C: European executives whose businesses require distributing consumer-focused software
through to individuals through online platforms are extremely concerned.
Hypothesis H2D: European executives whose businesses require selling cloud-based services to corporations are extremely concerned.
Hypothesis H2E: European military officers are extremely concerned.
Hypothesis H2F: European executives whose businesses require intense interaction between their companies and their consumer products after sales are extremely concerned.
Hypothesis H3: European executives do not agree on
the causes of American domination of net-based businesses.
Hypothesis H3A: Some European executives believe
American domination is due to advantages resulting
from selling into a single market.
Hypothesis H3B: Some European executives believe
American domination is due to first mover advantages.
Hypothesis H3C: Some European executives believe
American domination is due to a greater appetite for
risk among venture capital and private equity firms.
Hypothesis H3D: Some European executives believe
American domination is due to a greater willingness to
skirt the limits of the law or the limits of enforcement
of the law.
Hypothesis H3E: Some European executives believe
American domination is due to lax enforcement of privacy laws, lax enforcement of antimonopoly law, gaps
in monopoly law, or some combination of these factors.
Hypothesis H4: European executives do not agree on
the future impact of the internet of things.
Hypothesis H4A: Some European executives believe
that the internet of things will create new problems for
manufacturers of products that require interaction between the company and their products after sale, because giant platforms are better positioned to control
interactions with consumers.
Hypothesis H4B: Military officers believe that the internet of things will create new national security problems, due to the loss of control of critical infrastructure.
Hypothesis H4C: Some European executives believe
that the internet of things will create no new problems
for them, because their companies or their industries
will be able to respond effectively.
Hypothesis H5: European executives do not agree on
the way forward, or on the nature of appropriate responses to American domination of the net.
Hypothesis H5A: Some European executives believe
that it is too late for any effective response.
Hypothesis H5B: Some European executives believe
that better privacy regulation and better enforcement

under the GDPR may help reduce the dominance of
American platform operators.
Hypothesis H5C: Some European executives believe
that the transparency and transportability control offered by the GDPR may help reduce the dominance of
American platform operators.
Hypothesis H5D: Some European executives believe
that clarification, modernization, and enforcement of
antitrust law may help reduce the dominance of American platform operators.
Hypothesis H5E: Some European executives believe
that cooperation within their industries may provide
meaningful alternatives to existing platforms and thus
may help reduce the dominance of American platform
operators.
Hypothesis H6: The impact of American platform operators’ domination of the net can be measured.
Hypothesis H6A: Traditional European chemical
companies like AGFA and heavy industrial manufacturers like Siemens are performing at their traditional
levels and have not yet been affected.
Hypothesis H6B: Traditional European service firms
like Allianz and Deutsche Bank are performing at their
traditional levels and have not yet been affected.
Hypothesis H6C: Traditional European retailers are
starting to show the impact of competition from online
sellers.
Hypothesis H6D: Software vendors like SAP are not
affected in their traditional businesses but are unable
to expand into areas like cloud services.
Hypothesis H6E: The EU equivalents of Giant pure
internet companies like Google and Facebook are totally absent, and app developers are surviving only at
the fringes and cannot compete successfully in critical
areas like mapping or mail.

9. Limitations of Our Current Research
We see six limitations in our current research, all of
which will be addressed in the subsequent stages of
our research program.
• The first and most obvious limitation is the fact that
all of our subjects were German executives. This
would be a problem if executives in other major
EU economies face a different set of problems.
• The second limitation is a result of the small size
of our initial sample [5, 27]. While a ten interviews
may be enough to identify the set of critical issues,
it is certainly not enough to identify their relative
importance.
• Interviewer bias may be significant [2, 17]. We
have our own expectations about how the netbased economy works and about how platform industries operate. We may have unconsciously led
or subjects in directions that we expected them to
follow, or we may have unconsciously interpreted
their comments in ways that supported our expectations.
• Recency bias may be significant [10, 16]. The new
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General Data Protection Regulation had gone into
effect days before our interviews and may had
caused viewers to see privacy violations as a
greater contributor to American domination than
they would have previously. Alternatively, the implementation of the GDPR or may have led subjects to see the problem of privacy violation as
more completely solved than they would have seen
it before and thus as a less significant element in
the domination of the net by American platform
operators.
• Other, well-known effects may be significant, such
as participant bias. Often in experiments where
subjects are paid they seek to “to a good job” and
they attempt to guess what the experimenters want
to observe and then try to respond accordingly.
That is not likely to be a factor here, but there is
still a possibility that subjects may have attempted
to cooperate and may have attempted to provide the
answers we expected.
• Finally, while attitudinal studies will help us understand why certain effects may have occurred, they
cannot demonstrate that they have indeed already
occurred. Attitudinal studies complement econometric analyses, but they cannot substitute for
econometric analyses.

10. Future Research — Addressing The
Limitations of Our Current Research.
Our future research has three key elements. First we
will conduct a additional interviews with executives in
France, Britain, and Denmark, to learn if there are additional issues we should have included when constructing our hypotheses. Next, we will survey a broad
executives in different positions, and in a wider range
of industries, in Germany and elsewhere in the EU.
We will also include government officials, industry associations, and military officers in our survey. This
survey will specifically address our attitudinal hypotheses. We will determine if these executives believe
that there is a problem with the domination of the net
by American platform operators. We will determine,
for those executives who do believe that there is a
problem, what they believe the causes were.
Finally, we will conduct econometric analyses to
determine where EU firms have demonstrably suffered adverse effects that could be explained by American domination of the net. Even if we can demonstrate
harm we will not have established causality of course.
But we will have demonstrated that there are economic
effects that are consistent with the beliefs of European
executives, and that are at least correlated with the effects of American domination of the net.

11. Summary and Contributions
We feel that the topic of control of online infrastructure is vitally important. As trade in services becomes
more important, and as international trade disputes are

increasing, it is important to understand the extent to
which domination of the net by American platform operators does or does not affect the EU economy. We
believe that our interviews have enabled us to create a
set of testable hypotheses, which makes a modest contribution to our understanding of this phenomenon.
While there is universal agreement among our interview subjects that the net is dominated by American
operators of platforms, there was little consensus on
causes, effects, or appropriate responses. Our survey
will allow us to assess the perceived relative importance of different factors, as causes, as impacts, and
as responses.

12. References
[1] Allcott, H., and Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social
media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211-236.
[2] Bailar, B., Bailey, L., and Stevens, J. (1977).
Measures of interviewer bias and variance.
Journal of Marketing Research, 337-343.
[3] Benbasat, I., Goldstein, D. K., and Mead, M.
(1987). The case research strategy in studies of
information systems. MIS Quarterly, 11(3), 369386.
[4] Bittlingmayer, G., and Hazlett, T. W. (2000).
DOS Kapital: Has antitrust action against
Microsoft created value in the computer industry?
Journal of Financial Economics, 55(3), 329-359.
[5] Button, K. S., Ioannidis, J. P., Mokrysz, C., Nosek,
B. A., Flint, J., Robinson, E. S., and Munafò, M.
R. (2013). Power failure: why small sample size
undermines the reliability of neuroscience. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience, 14(5), 365-376.
[6] Clemons, E. K., and Thatcher, M. E. (1998).
Capital One: Exploiting an information-based
strategy. Paper presented at the System Sciences,
1998., Proceedings of the Thirty-First Hawaii
International Conference on.
[7] Clemons, E. K. and Thatcher, M. E. (2008).
“Capital One Financial and a Decade of
Experience with Newly Vulnerable Markets:
Some Propositions Concerning the Competitive
Advantage of New Entrants”, Journal of Strategic
Information Systems, Vol. 17, No. 3, Sept. 2008,
pp. 179-189.
[8] Clemons, E. K., and Wilson, J. (2016).
Selbstschutz ist nicht gleich Protektionismus.
Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost.de/eric-kclemons/eu-datenschutz-rechtswidrigeunternehmenspraktiken_b_8490876.html
[9] Dlouhy, J. A. (2018) “Trump’s Coal Gambit May
Yield Political Points But Not Mining Jobs”,
Bloomberg,
June
14,
2018,
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0614/trump-s-coal-gambit-may-yield-politicalpoints-not-mining-jobs.
[10] Eagle, N., Pentland, A. S., and Lazer, D. (2009).
Page 6131

Inferring friendship network structure by using
mobile phone data. Proceedings of the national
academy of sciences, 106(36), 15274-15278.
[11] Edelman, B. (2015). Does Google leverage
market power through tying and bundling?
Journal of Competition Law and Economics,
11(2), 365-400.
[12] Edelman, B., and Geradin, D. (2016). Android
and competition law: exploring and assessing
Google’s practices in mobile. European
Competition Journal, 12(2-3), 159-194.
[13] Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from
case study research. Academy of management
review, 14(4), 532-550.
[14] Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., and Van Alstyne, M.
W. (2006). Strategies for two-sided markets.
Harvard business review, 84(10), 92.
[15] Granados, N. F., Kauffman, R. J., and King, B.
(2008). How has electronic travel distribution
been transformed? A test of the theory of newly
vulnerable markets. Journal of Management
Information Systems, 25(2), 73-96.
[16] Hallowell, M. R., and Gambatese, J. A. (2010).
Qualitative research: Application of the Delphi
method to CEM research. Journal of construction
engineering and management, 136(1), 99-107.
[17] Hildum, D. C., and Brown, R. W. (1956). Verbal
reinforcement and interviewer bias. The Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53(1), 108111.
[18] Jick, T. D. (1979). Mixing qualitative and
quantitative methods: Triangulation in action.
Administrative science quarterly, 24(4), 602-611.
[19] Lambert, N. A. (1995). Admiral Sir John Fisher
and the concept of flotilla defence, 1904-1909.
The Journal of Military History, 59(4), 639-660.
[20] Lee, A. S. (1989). "A Scientific Method for MIS
Case Studies", MIS Quarterly , March 1989, pp.
33-49.
[21] Lundberg, C. C. (1976). Hypothesis creation in
organizational behavior research. Academy of
management review, 1(2), 5-12.
[22] Lykken, D. T. (1968). Statistical significance in
psychological research. Psychological bulletin,
70(3p1), 151-159.
[23] Parker, G. G., and Van Alstyne, M. W. (2005).
Two-sided network effects: A theory of
information product design. Management science,
51(10), 1494-1504.
[24] Parker, G. and Van Alsyne, M. (2016) Platform
Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming the Economy - and How to Make Them
Work for You, W. W. Norton & Company, pp.
352.
[25] Rainie, H., Anderson, J. Q., and Albright, J.
(2017). The future of free speech, trolls,
anonymity and fake news online: Pew Research
Center Washington, DC.
[26] Saint, N. (2010). Eric Schmidt: Google's Policy Is

To "Get Right Up To The Creepy Line And Not
Cross
It".
Retrieved
from
www.businessinsider.com/eric-schmidt-googlespolicy-is-to-get-right-up-to-the-creepy-line-andnot-cross-it-2010-10?IR=T
[27] Sandelowski, M. (1995). Sample size in
qualitative research. Research in nursing and
health, 18(2), 179-183.
[28] Satariano, A. and Nicas, J. “E.U. Fines Google
$5.1 Billion in Android Antitrust Case”, The New
York
Times,
July
18,
2018,
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/googl
e-eu-android-fine.html.
[29] Sayer, P. (2018). “Android and antitrust: The EU's
Google case explained”, ComputerWorld, June 7,
2018,
www.computerworld.com/article/3279954/mobil
e-wireless/android-and-antitrust-the-eus-googlecase-explained.html.
[30] Speed, E., and Mannion, R. (2017). The rise of
post-truth populism in pluralist liberal
democracies: challenges for health policy.
International journal of health policy and
management, 6(5), 249-251.
[31] Swanson , A. “White House to Impose Metal
Tariffs on E.U., Canada and Mexico”, The New
York
Times,
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/trumpaluminum-steel-tariffs.html.
[32] The Local. (2017). German corporations team up
against US tech heavyweights with new platform.
Retrieved
from
www.thelocal.de/20170828/germancorporations-team-up-against-us-techheavyweights-with-new-platform.
[33] U.S. Department of Justice. (1998). Complaint :
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. Retrieved from
www.justice.gov/atr/complaint-us-v-microsoftcorp.
[34] Wu, T. (2010). The Master Switch: The Rise and
Fall of Information, Knopf pp. 384.

13. Appendix A — Sources for Reports on
Incidents of Privacy Violations
1. Barrett, Brian. "Spotify clears up its controversial
privacy
policy."
Wired.
2015,
www.wired.com/2015/08/spotify-clears-up-itsprivacy-policy/"
2. Belgium probes Google's Street View." AFP.
2011,
phys.org/news/2011-04-belgium-probesgoogle-street-view.html.
3. Conner, Cheryl. "Your privacy has gone to the
[Angry] Birds." Forbes. 2012, www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2012/12/05/your-privacy-has-gone-to-the-angrybirds/#2ed9997a39b6.
4. "Consumer watchdog asks FTC to act against
Google Home; Amazon Echo digital assistants for
Page 6132

Deception, COPPA violation." Consumer Watchdog.
2017,
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/consumer-watchdog-asks-ftc-to-actagainst-google-home-amazon-echo-digital-assistants-for-deception-coppa-violation300573395.html.
5. Crosman, Penny. "Large U.S. banks scramble to
meet EU data privacy rules." American Banker.
2018, www.americanbanker.com/news/large-usbanks-scramble-to-meet-eu-data-privacy-rules.
6. Deahl, Dani. "Seattle says Facebook has violated
its political ad transparency law." The Verge.
2018, www.theverge.com/2018/2/7/16988030/seattle-facebook-violated-political-ad-transparencylaw.
7. Eddy, Melissa and Scott, Mark. "Delete hate
speech or pay up, Germany tells social media companies." The New York Times. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/business/germany-facebook-google-twitter.html.
8. Enright, Allison. "Privacy suit takes aim at Amazon." Digital Commerce 360. 2011, www.digitalcommerce360.com/2011/03/04/privacy-suittakes-aim-amazon/.
9. "EU court backs 'right to be forgotten' in Google
case." BBC. 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27388289.
10. “EU Directive 95/46/EC - The Data Protection Directive.”
Data
Protection
Commission,
www.dataprotection.ie/docs/EU-Directive-95-46EC-Chapter-1/92.htm.
11. Fair, Lesley. "FTC settlement with Amazon yields
$70 million for consumers, advice for business."
Federal
Trade
Commission.
2017,
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2017/05/ftc-settlement-amazon-yields-70million-consumers-advice.
12. Farivar, Cyrus. "Czech Republic stops Google
from further Street View photography." Reuters.
2010,
www.dw.com/en/czech-republic-stopsgoogle-from-further-street-view-photography/a6006085.
13. Federal Data Protection Act. German Law Archive.
2017,
germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=712.
14. Fioretti, Julia. "EU court rejects Facebook class action suit by privacy activist." Reuters. 2018,
www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-court-facebookprivacy/eu-court-rejects-facebook-class-actionsuit-by-privacy-activist-idUSKBN1FD33U.
15. Gijzemijter, Martin. "Privacy outrage causes bank
to ditch plans for targeted ads based on customers'
spending
habits."
ZDNet.
2014,
www.zdnet.com/article/privacy-outrage-causesbank-to-ditch-plans-for-targeted-ads-based-oncustomers-spending-habits/.
16. Goodin, Dan. "Researchers find 256 iOS apps that
collect users' personal info." Ars Technica. 2015,

arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/10/researchers-find-256-ios-apps-thatcollect-users-personal-info/.
17. "Google bosses convicted in Italy." BBC, 2010,
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8533695.stm.
18. "Google faces $18 million fine for web privacy violations: Dutch watchdog." Reuters, 2014,
www.reuters.com/article/us-privacy-googledutch/google-faces-18-million-fine-for-web-privacy-violations-dutch-watchdog-idUSKBN0JT1TG20141215.
19. "Google loses UK appeal court battle over 'clandestine' tracking." The Guardian. 2015,
www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/27/google-loses-uk-appeal-courtbattle-clandestine-tracking.
20. Granville, Kevin. "Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What you need to know as fallout widens."
The New York Times. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html.
21. Greenwald, Glenn et al. "Microsoft handed the
NSA access to encrypted messages." The Guardian.
2013,
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data.
22. Hattem, Julian. "Verizon to pay $7M over privacy
violations." The Hill. 2014, thehill.com/policy/technology/216514-verizon-to-pay-7-millionover-privacy-violation.
23. Hern, Alex. "Uber broke Apple's iOS privacy rules
and Tim Cook wasn't happy about it." The Guardian,
2017,
www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/24/uber-broke-apple-ios-privacyrules-tim-cook-travis-kalanick.
24. Jolly, Ieuan. “Data protection in the United States:
Overview.” Thomson Reuters Practical Law.
2017,
content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/Vie
w/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.
25. Kang. Y. Peter. "HSBC to pay $13M to end privacy row over recorded calls." Law360. 2016,
www.law360.com/articles/833597/hsbc-to-pay13m-to-end-privacy-row-over-recorded-calls.
26. Kiss, Jemima. "Google admits collecting Wi-Fi
data through Street View cars." The Guardian.
2010,
www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/may/15/google-admits-storing-privatedata.
27. Koh, Yoree. "Twitter hit with suit claiming it
snoops on direct messages." The Wall Street Journal. 2015. www.business-humanrights.org/en/usausers-sue-twitter-for-violating-privacy-laws-byallegedly-intercepting-reading-direct-messages#c127922.
28. Lee, Dave. "Lyft investigates privacy abuse
claim." BBC. 2018. www.bbc.com/news/technology-42827636.
Page 6133

29. Lomas, Natasha. "Facebook fined $122M in Europe over misleading WhatsApp filing."
TechCrunch,
2017.
techcrunch.com/2017/05/18/facebook-fined122m-in-europe-over-misleading-whatsapp-filing/.
30. Lomas, Natasha. "Facebook fined €1.2M for privacy violations in Spain." TechCrunch. 2017,
techcrunch.com/2017/09/11/facebook-fined-e12m-for-privacy-violations-in-spain/.
31. Lomas, Natasha. "Uber agrees to 20 years of privacy audits to settle FTC data mishandling probe."
TechCrunch.
2017,
techcrunch.com/2017/08/15/uber-agrees-to-20years-of-privacy-audits-to-settle-ftc-data-mishandling-probe/.
32. McLernon, Sean. "Santander unit accused of secretly recording phone calls." Law360. 2013,
www.law360.com/articles/416198/santander-unitaccused-of-secretly-recording-phone-calls.
33. Moody, Glyn. "Detailed medical records of 61 million Italian citizens to be given to IBM for its “cognitive computing” system Watson." Privacy News
Online.
2017,
www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/2017/05/detailed-medical-records61-million-italian-citizens..
34. O’Connor, Nuala. “Reforming the U.S. approach
to data protection and privacy.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2018, www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection.
35. Ozer, Nicole. "Note to self: Siri not just working
for me, working full-time for Apple, too." ACLU.
2012, www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/noteself-siri-not-just-working-me-working-full-timeapple-too.
36. "Prime example of privacy violation? Amazon
wristband." Liquid Litigation Management, Inc.
2018, www.liquidlitigation.com/blog/prime-example-privacy-violation-amazon-wristband/.
37. Quain, John. "Changes to OnStar's privacy terms
rile some users." The New York Times. 2011,
wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/changesto-onstars-privacy-terms-rile-some-users/.
38. Rach, Claudia. "Google may drop Street View in
EU if photo storage time is cut." Bloomberg Businessweek.
2010.
web.archive.org/web/20101121041217/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-03/google-maydrop-street-view-in-eu-if-photo-storage-time-iscut.html.
39. Reardon, Marguerite. "Verizon racks up $1.35M
Location of
Firm
US
EU

Incidents Reported
In US
In EU
21
19
6
3

fine for violating consumer privacy." CNET. 2016,
www.cnet.com/news/verizon-racks-up-1-35-mbill-for-violating-consumer-privacy/.
40. Ruiz, Rebecca. "F.C.C. fines AT&T $25 million
for privacy breach." The New York Times. 2015,
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/f-c-c-finesatt-25-million-for-privacy-breach/.
41. Scott, Mark. "Facebook gets slap on the wrist from
2 European privacy regulators." The New York
Times. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/technology/facebook-privacy-france-netherlands.html.
42. "Shazam is always listening to everything you're
doing."
New
York
Post.
2016,
nypost.com/2016/11/15/shazam-is-always-listeningto-everything-youre-doing/.
43. Singel, Ryan. "Foursquare puts money before privacy."
Wired.
2010,
www.wired.com/2010/06/foursquare-privacyfunding/.
44. Streitfeld, David. "Google concedes that drive-by
prying violated privacy." The New York Times.
2013,
www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/technology/google-pays-fine-over-street-view-privacybreach.html.
45. "Telefonica planning to sell anonymized customer
data." Handelsblatt. 2017, global.handelsblatt.com/companies/telefonica-exposed-for-selling-customer-data-711974.
46. Toor, Amar. "Facebook is still violating user privacy, Dutch and French regulators say." The
Verge.
2017,
www.theverge.com/2017/5/17/15651740/facebook-privacyviolation-france-netherlands-fine.
47. Treanor, Jill. "Tesco Bank cyber-thieves stole
£2.5m from 9,000 people." The Guardian. 2016,
www.theguardian.com/business/2016/nov/08/tesco-bank-cyber-thieves-25m.
48. Wouters, Jorgen. "Disney-owned company fined
$3 million for children's privacy violations."
AOL.com, 2011. www.aol.com/2011/05/13/disney-owned-company-fined-3-million-for-childrens-privacy-vio/.
49. Zeldin, Wendy. "Switzerland: Court decision in
privacy violation case partially favorable to
Google." The Law Library of Congress. 2012,
www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/switzerland-court-decision-in-privacy-violation-case-partially-favorable-to-google/.

Formal Complaints
In US
In EU
10
17
1
0

Penalty Imposed
In US
In EU
8
13
1
0

Table 1.—Analysis of incidents of privacy violation, formal legal and regulatory complaints, and
punishments, comparing US and EU firms from 2010 through 2018.
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